TRUMP & PEACE

Roberto Salazar (*)
Sep 25
7 min read

In this article, www.adnplus.co.uk presents a compilation of facts comparing leaders both in their first 200 days and over their full terms, using (1) a strict, evidence-based standard and (2) a more relaxed “reclamatory” standard of war-ending "management" based on globally covered claims in world forums. While academic, you will find we have kept it readable, citation-backed, and consistent with our principle as Economists: —no double standards—.

TRUMP & PEACE: Public Claims vs. Verified Records

By Roberto F. Salazar-Córdova, for www.adnplus.co.uk

Introduction: No Double Standards

In anything we -Economists- do, we do not like double standards.

Many journalists have been very harsh with Donald Trump after his 2025 United Nations speech—but too often they don’t first define what ending a war means, nor do they compare his record (both as claims and as verified outcomes) against other U.S. presidents, UN Secretaries-General, or leaders of other permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5).

Without a consistent yardstick, judgments become rhetorical rather than historical—and journalists and analysts can slip into the very behavior they accuse Trump of: making sweeping assertions without stating their standard or applying it uniformly.

To avoid that trap, I apply two uniform measures to everyone:

Strict standard (A) — verified outcomes. A conflict counts as a war if it causes ≥25 battle-related deaths in a year (UCDP), and a major war is ≥1,000 deaths/year (SIPRI). “Ending” a war requires a peace treaty, or an indefinite/“general” ceasefire that holds for ~12 months, or complete withdrawal with an official end of combat—all grounded in UN and ICRC practice.
Reclamatory standard (B) — public claims in world forums. If a leader publicly claims in a global forum (e.g., UNGA, major summits) that they “ended a war” and that claim is covered globally with at least minimal documentation (statement, ceasefire announcement, diplomatic communiqués), it counts as a claim. This captures how leaders present themselves as peacemakers—without replacing the strict measure.

Under this vertical of relaxed vs strict standard, we analise also a horizontal line: Time windows assessed for all leaders: (i) the first 200 days (≈ seven months) in office, and (ii) the entire term.

Results at a Glance

First 200 days (1985–2025):

Strict (A): Zero U.S. presidents and zero other P5 heads ended a war in their first 200 days. Only one UN Secretary-General achieved a verified end within 200 days: Boutros Boutros-Ghali with the Chapultepec Peace Accords in El Salvador (Jan. 16, 1992)—ceasefire effective Feb. 1, 1992, ONUSAL verification.
Reclamatory (B): Trump stands out for the volume and timing of public claims—e.g., at UNGA 2025 he said he had “ended seven unendable wars in seven months,” a line widely reported and fact-checked. Others made far fewer or later claims.

Over the full term(s):

U.S. presidents show several verified war-end or peace-deal milestones across full terms (not in the first 200 days):
- G.H.W. Bush (1989–93): Gulf War ceasefire via UNSCR 687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
- Clinton (1993–2001): Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty (Oct. 26, 1994); Dayton Accords ending the Bosnian War (Dec. 14, 1995).
- Obama (2009–17): End of U.S. combat operations in Iraq (Aug. 31, 2010).
- Biden (2021–) End of U.S. military presence in Afghanistan (Aug. 30/31, 2021).
- Trump (2017–21; 2025–): prominent normalizations (e.g., Abraham Accords) and multiple 2025 claims; however, strict (A) yields no unambiguous war terminations in first 200 days of either term; full-term verified “ends” remain debated by datasets and legal criteria.
P5 leaders beyond the U.S.:
- UK (Blair): the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement (Apr. 10, 1998) largely ended the Troubles—a long intrastate conflict—during the term, not in the first 200 days.
- Russia/USSR (Gorbachev): Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan completed Feb. 15, 1989, ending the Soviet-Afghan War—during the term, not within 200 days.
- France: multiple African interventions and mediated processes, but no clear, singular “war ended” milestone in first 200 days; full-term outcomes are mixed and often shared with regional/UN mediation. (Examples include Côte d’Ivoire and Mali processes.)
- China: no comparable war-end claims or verified terminations in early months; full-term posture emphasizes non-interventionist rhetoric.
UN Secretaries-General (full terms):
Beyond El Salvador (1992), the UN system supported several term-time settlements such as Mozambique’s General Peace Agreement (Oct. 4, 1992) with ONUMOZ deployment under UNSCR 797 (1992); Sierra Leone’s Lomé Peace Agreement (1999) with UNAMSIL to implement it; East Timor 1999–2002 (UNAMET/INTERFET/UNTAET) leading to independence—illustrating that, across full terms, the UN often oversees ends of wars even when first-200-day windows are barren.

You are invited to continue the reading:

Abstract / Index

I. Why two standards are needed (and how media can mirror what they criticize)

II. Definitions and sources (UCDP/SIPRI/ICRC/UN)

III. First-200-days analysis (A vs. B) across U.S., P5, and UN SGs

IV. Full-term analysis (A vs. B) across U.S., P5, and UN SGs

V. Trump’s 2025 claims in context

VI. Comparative insights: claims vs. facts

VII. Conclusion: one yardstick, or none

I. Why Two Standards Are Needed

Politics runs on institutions (treaties, ceasefires, withdrawals) and narratives (what leaders claim on global stages).

If commentators ignore either side, they risk error.

Worse, by criticizing Trump’s rhetoric without defining their own metric or applying it to others, analysts can reproduce the same rhetorical inflation they condemn.

A dual-track evaluation—strict outcomes and public claims—captures both realities, with one uniform yardstick for all.

II. Definitions and Sources

War / armed conflict: ≥25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year (UCDP). Major war: ≥1,000 deaths/year (SIPRI).
Ending a war (strict): peace accord resolving incompatibility; indefinite/general ceasefire sustained over time; or complete withdrawal + official end of combat, consistent with UN ceasefire guidance and ICRC’s facts-based legal baseline.
Reclamatory standard: count formal public claims of having “ended” a war made at UNGA or equivalent and covered by global media/transcripts; it measures what leaders claim—not proof of durability.

III. First-200-Days: What Actually Ends vs. What Is Claimed

Strict (A): From 1985 to 2025, no U.S. president or other P5 head ended a war in the first 200 days. The sole verified exception among global leaders is UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali via El Salvador’s Chapultepec Peace Accords (Jan. 16, 1992; ceasefire Feb. 1, verified by ONUSAL).

Reclamatory (B): Trump is the outlier in early claims. In UNGA 2025 he asserted he had “ended seven unendable wars in seven months,” a line recorded in official venues and intensively fact-checked worldwide. Other leaders delivered peace rhetoric, but seldom early-term “I ended X war” claims at that scale.

IV. Over the Full Term(s): What Actually Ends vs. What Is Claimed

United States (strict A):

George H. W. Bush: UNSCR 687 formalized the Gulf War ceasefire (1991).
Bill Clinton: Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty (1994); Dayton/Paris (1995) ended the Bosnian War.
Barack Obama: End of U.S. combat operations in Iraq (Aug. 31, 2010).
Joe Biden: End of U.S. Afghanistan presence (Aug. 30/31, 2021).
Donald Trump (terms combined): conspicuous peacemaking claims (2025 UNGA) and diplomatic deals (e.g., normalizations) exist; nevertheless, verified war terminations remain contested under strict criteria.

Other P5 leaders (strict A):

United Kingdom (Tony Blair): Good Friday Agreement (Apr. 10, 1998) largely ended the Troubles—a major intrastate conflict—within the term, not within 200 days.
Russia/USSR (Mikhail Gorbachev): Soviet withdrawal completed Feb. 15, 1989, closing the Soviet-Afghan War—again, within the term, not in 200 days.
France / China: no singular, unambiguous cases comparable to the above that both (a) meet strict end-of-war thresholds and (b) fall within first 200 days. Over full terms, France participated in African peace processes; China’s posture produced no analogous “war ended” milestones.

UN Secretaries-General (strict A, full terms):

Beyond El Salvador (1992), the UN oversaw multiple end-games: Mozambique’s General Peace Agreement (Oct. 4, 1992) with ONUMOZ (UNSCR 797, Dec. 16, 1992); Sierra Leone’s Lomé Agreement (1999) with UNAMSIL; East Timor (1999 referendum → INTERFET, then UNTAET → independence 2002). These are term-time closures, not first-200-day events—illustrating that verified endings skew later in tenures.

Reclamatory (B), full terms:

Under the “public claim” lens, Trump’s 2025 rhetoric is markedly higher-volume and earlier than peers’ claims (Obama’s “ending America’s wars” remarks came later; UK, French, Russian, and Chinese leaders rarely claim early definitive “war endings” at UNGA scale).

V. Trump’s 2025 Claims in Context

Trump’s UNGA 2025 line—“ended seven unendable wars in seven months”—is documented in UNGA records, transcripts, and extensive media coverage, alongside prominent fact-checks disputing its factual basis under strict criteria.

Under Reclamatory (B), these count as claims. Under Strict (A), they do not constitute verified war endings in the first 200 days.

VI. Comparative Insights: Claims vs. Facts

Two pictures emerge:

By strict evidence (A): In the first 200 days, Trump equals the presidential and P5 average: zero. Only Boutros-Ghali breaks the pattern (El Salvador, 1992). Over full terms, several leaders (Bush, Clinton, Obama, Biden; Blair; Gorbachev) register verified closures or settlements—but not in their first 200 days.
By reclamatory claims (B): Trump clearly stands out for frequency and timing of early, global claims. Others make peace claims too, but fewer, later, and with narrower framing.

And here is the mirror: commentators can replicate what they criticize. Condemning Trump’s rhetoric without stating a standard and without comparative baselines risks rhetorical inflation—just from the opposite side. A consistent two-track yardstick fixes that.

VII. Conclusion: One Yardstick—or None

If we judge by strict, verifiable outcomes, Trump—like every U.S. president and other P5 heads in their first seven months—ended no wars; only Boutros-Ghali did (El Salvador, 1992). Over full terms, multiple leaders notch genuine war-end or peace-treaty milestones, but these typically happen well after the 200-day mark.

If instead we judge by what leaders publicly claim in world forums, Trump is exceptional for the volume and early timing of his peace claims.

In Life, we value results and effort. Obama's Nobel Prize for his efforts (under a stric standard) cannot be fairer than one of such prizes for Trump.

Both pictures (results and effort) are true—and both must be held together.

Analysts and journalists should either measure everyone by facts or everyone by claims.

The World need more peace-makers and, as Trump asked: more cooperation of every leader.

Anything else is, quite simply, a double standard.

Roberto F. Salazar-Córdova

Hexagon Dialogue, ANDES.

WWW.ADNPLUS.CO.UK

Key Sources

Conflict thresholds & “major war”: UCDP/SIPRI.
Ceasefire/termination practice: UN Peacemaker 2022 Guidance; ICRC definition of armed conflict.
Boutros-Ghali / El Salvador (1992): Chapultepec accord; ONUSAL verification.
Gulf War ceasefire (UNSCR 687, 1991).
Israel–Jordan treaty (1994).
Dayton/Paris (1995) — ended Bosnian War.
Iraq end of U.S. combat (Aug. 31, 2010).
Afghanistan U.S. exit (Aug. 30/31, 2021).
Good Friday Agreement (1998).
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (1989).
Mozambique GPA (1992) / ONUMOZ (UNSCR 797); Sierra Leone Lomé (1999) / UNAMSIL; East Timor 1999–2002 (UN role).
Trump UNGA 2025 claims (transcripts/coverage/fact-checks).